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I. INTRODUCTION
Creditor committees in reorganization cases play an important role in the bankruptcy
system. For example, a committee is empowered to investigate the financial affairs of the
debtor and to make recommendations to the class of creditors it represents regarding,
among other things, the debtor's ability to reorganize.' In certain instances, creditor com-
mittees -because of inexperience, lack of knowledge of the law, or the frustration poten-
tially inherent in a collective effort to improve the position of the creditors they
represent-make statements which are actually or potentially defamatory,2 which do or
may interfere with contracts or business relationships, 3 or which fail to discharge the com-
mittee's fiduciary obligation4 to the creditors represented by the committee. Such state-
ments, regardless of motivation, can have significant adverse effects upon the
reorganization attempt and have been increasingly the subject of actions brought by
debtors, other creditors, equity security holders, and others. This article will survey the
law relative to statements made by creditor committees so as to permit all interests repre-
sented in reorganization cases to better calculate their respective rights and obligations as
members of committees or with respect to such committees.
II. STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR CREDITOR COMMITTEES
A. Basis for Appointment
In a case commenced under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (Code),5
the appointment of a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims against the debtor is
I. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)-(3) (1988).
2. See inftr text accompanying notes 27-62.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 95-99.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 19-21 & 93-94.
5. II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
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mandatory.6 Pursuant to section 1 102(a)(2) of the Code, 7 the bankruptcy court "may or-
der the appointment of additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders if
necessary to assure adequate representation of creditors or of equity security holders."'
B. Powers and Duties of Committees
1. Statutory Powers
Pursuant to section 1103(c) of the Code, 9 a committee appointed under section 1102 of
the Code may:
(1) consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the administration of the case;
(2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the
operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and
any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan;
(3) participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those represented by such committee of
such committee's determinations as to any plan formulated, and collect and file with the court
acceptances or rejections of a plan;
(4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner under section 1104 of [the Code]; 10 and
(5) perform such other services as are in the interest of those represented.' 1
A section 1102 committee may also, subject to bankruptcy court approval, "select and
authorize the employment. . . of one or more attorneys, accountants, or other agents, to
represent or perform services for such committee."1 2 Finally, a committee may raise, ap-
pear, and be heard on any issue in a Chapter 11 case13 and may request the appointment of
a Chapter 11 trustee for "cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mis-
management of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the
commencement of the case ...."14
Section 1103(c)(1) of the Code authorizes a committee to "consult with" the debtor but
does not authorize the committee to "operate" the debtor's business. 15 The Code has dele-
gated to committees broader administrative responsibilities than those possessed by com-
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)(1988). Under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-755, (Act), appointment of a
creditor committee in a Chapter XI case was discretionary with the court. See former II U.S.C. § 738 (1946). The Act was
repealed on Oct. 1, 1979, when the Code became effective. See Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat.
2682 (1978).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (1988).
8. I1 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2). The majority of reported decisions discussed in this article deal with bankruptcy cases in which
a single creditor committee was appointed. However, the principles of creditor committee liability discussed in these cases are,
logically, applicable to appointed committees in all Chapter 11 cases, regardless of their number or constituency.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1988).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(1988).
11. II U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1988). In a Chapter XI case commenced under the Act, creditor committees were empowered to
perform functions generally similar to those performed by a Code section 1102 committee. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 739 (1946)
and former Chapter XI Rule 11-29(a) with section 1103(c) of the Code.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1988).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
15. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1103.07[3] (15th ed. 1979) [hereinafter 5 COLLIER].
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mittees under the Act.1 6  However, the role of the Chapter 11 committee is still largely
advisory in nature.1 7 Chapter 11 committees may make recommendations concerning the
debtor's business but cannot displace the persons who are legally responsible for manage-
ment of the debtor's financial affairs.' 8
2. Fiduciary Duties
Notwithstanding their generally advisory role in reorganization cases, members of
committees previously organized under the Act, and currently organized under the Code,
owe a fiduciary duty to the holders of the class of claims or interests they represent.' 9 They
must perform their statutory functions with an undivided loyalty, 20 and committee mem-
16. For example, bankruptcy judges and referees under the Act presided at the first meeting of creditors, at which, among
other things, a committee was elected and the debtor was examined regarding matters relevant to the proceeding. See II U.S.C.
§§ 736, 738 (1946). On the other hand, II U.S.C. § 341 (c) (1988), prohibits the bankruptcy judge from presiding at or attend-
ing meetings of creditors. The House Report accompanying section 341 states:
In keeping with the thrust of the bill to remove the bankruptcy judge from administrative matters and not to involve him
in situations where he will hear evidence outside of the context of a dispute that he must decide, the bankruptcy judge
will not be the presiding officer at the meeting, and will not be authorized to question the debtor as he is today.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 331, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMJN. NEws 5963, 6287. In Chapter 11
cases under the Code, the United States Trustee appoints the unsecured creditors' committee required by section 1102 of the
Code. See II U.S.C. § I 102(a)(l) (1988). Thereafter, the committee and the trustee in the Chapter 11 case (usually the debtor-
in-possession, unless a Chapter II trustee is appointed, see II U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1104(a)) meet to "transact such business as
maybe necessary and proper." 11 U.S.C. § 1103(d) (1988). Such business might include the committee's enumerated functions
under Code section 1103(c).
17.5 COLLIER, supra note 15, at 1103.0713].
18. Id. See also In re UNR Indus., Inc., 10 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 964, 967 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1983), in which the court
declined to order the debtor to give the creditor committee prior notice before implementing certain management decisions. See
generally Blain & Erne, Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 oftthe United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition,
Powers and Duties, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 491, 503-05 (1984) [hereinafter Blain & Erne]. In a Chapter 7 liquidation case, the advi-
sory role of a creditor committee is even more limited. See II U.S.C. § 705(b) (1988) (pursuant to which a Chapter 7 creditor
committee may only consult with and make recommendations to the trustee or the United States Trustee regarding performance
of the trustee's duties and may only submit to the bankruptcy court or to the United States Trustee questions affecting the adminis-
tration of the estate).
19. See Woods v. City Nat'l Bank& Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, rehg denied, 312 U.S. 715 (1941) (court held that bondholders'
protective committee could not perfect its security claim for compensation because protective committee had conflicting inter-
ests to those of the bondholders, to whom it owed a fiduciary duty); Shaw & Levine v. Gulf W. Indus., Inc., 607 F.2d 258, 262
n.4 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941); 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 44.06 at
1653-54n.2 (14thed. 1975) (In rejecting creditor committee's motion to oppose the replacement of special counsel to debtor-in-
possession, court noted that creditor committees owe a fiduciary duty to the creditors, and must undertake all actions with the
purpose of protecting the rights of minority as well as majority creditors); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Lampl (In re Mesta
Mach. Co.), 67 Bankr. 151, 156 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (containing excellent discussion; in holding that creditor committee had
to return funds to the estate for failure to account for and to disclose a self-interest in the bankruptcy proceedings, the court stated
that, "[a]s fiduciaries, counsel and committee members have obligations of fidelity, undivided loyalty and impartial service in the
interest of the creditors they represent" (citing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1103.07)); Central Transp., Inc. v. Roberto (In re
Tucker Freight Lines, Inc.), 62 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986) (court held that when a creditor committee recommends
the "rejection of a [reorganization] plan for reasons the committee knew, or would have known but for their recklessness, to be
false," the committee violates its fiduciary duty to the creditors); See generally 5 COLLIER, supra note 15, at 1103.07; Blain &
Erne, supra note 18, at 514-16.
20. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Doan (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 Bankr. 919, 925 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court
held that where a representative or an agent of a creditor committee represents the interest of an individual member of a compet-
ing class of creditors whose purposes are dissimilar to those of the creditor committee, the representative or agent violates the
fiduciary duty of loyalty and disinterested service).
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bers must not use their individual positions to further their own interests at the expense of
other creditors.21
3. Conflict Between Statutory Powers and Legal Duties
Probably the most important functions performed by a committee are investigating the
affairs of the debtor and advising its constituency in relation to plan formulation, pursuant
to Code sections 1 103(c)(2) and (3). The performance of these functions is also the most
likely to generate potential claims against members of a committee. For example, state-
ments contained in a committee's report to its constituency may contain assertedly or actu-
ally false or misleading statements regarding the debtor or the debtor's principals. One
court considering such claims held that a committee's fiduciary duty to its constituent
creditors "requires that the committee's determinations must be honestly arrived at, and,
to the greatest degree possible, also accurate and correct. "22
Other courts have considered similar claims in relation to the law of defamation and in-
terference with business relations, without consideration of the committee's fiduciary du-
ties.23 Though these courts generally found that the alleged statements were privileged or
otherwise justified, the lack of privilege or justification could result in individual liability
to members of a committee. 24  Finally, some courts have considered claims of creditor
committee liability in the context of specific provisions of the Act25 and in the context of
specific Code provisions.26
III. COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE AS A DEFENSE TO CLAIMS
AGAINST COMMITTEES
A. Libel and Slander Defined
States will differ somewhat in their treatment of the elements of a cause of action for
libel or slander. However, the definition of libel which has received general acceptance
and approval is: "[A] malicious publication, expressed either in printing or writing, or by
signs and pictures, tending either to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or the reputa-
21. Id. at 925.
22. Central Transp., Inc. v. Roberto (In re Tucker Freight Lines, Inc.), 62 Bankr. 213, 216 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986) dis-
cussed more fully in notes 19 supra and 80 inftr (declining to grant summary judgment to members of a creditor committee on the
basis that their alleged misstatements were clothed with absolute immunity).
23. See infr text accompanying notes 42-62.
24. A creditor committee is similar to an unincorporated association. Most state courts hold that the individual members of an
unincorporated association are personally liable for tortious acts which they individually commit or participate in, or which they
authorize, assent to, or ratify. See Weese v. Stoddard, 63 N.M. 20, 312 P.2d 545 (1956) (court held that members ofan unincor-
porated association were not liable for the act of a member since, at the time of the accident causing damage to plaintiff, the
member was acting as an agent for someone other than the association); Westchester County v. Westchester County Fed'n of
Labor, 129 N.Y.S.2d 211 (1953) (court held members and officers of labor union liable for damages resulting from strike be-
cause the officers were directly involved and the members ratified the action of the officers by not objecting to the officers' action
when they were presented to the membership). See also 6 AM. JUR. 2D Associations and Clubs § 48 (2d ed. 1963) (personal
liability of individual members of an unincorporated association). Thus, if it is proven that the tortious (and unprivileged or
unjustified) statements of a committee member can be attributed to the committee as a whole, all members of the committee can
expect to be held personally liable for damages resulting from such statements.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 65-73 (cases under II U.S.C. § 44(i) (1946), which afforded a qualified immunity for
statements made in connection with bankruptcy cases).
26. For example, the injunctive powers afforded by II U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988) have been utilized by a bankruptcy court to
enjoin a state court defamation case against members ofa creditor committee. See Polygram Distrib., Inc. v. B-A Systems, Inc.
(In re Burstein-Appleby Co.), 63 Bankr. 1011 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986), discussed infra Section IV(B).
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tion of one who is alive, and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule."27 Slan-
der, on the other hand, is the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, gestures
or any form of communication other than those constituting libel. 28 While in some juris-
dictions libel and slander are defined by statute,29 in the following discussion the foregoing
definitions of libel and slander will be considered the generally accepted standards.
B. Types of Privilege
1. Absolute Privilege
In the context of an action for libel or slander, an absolutely privileged communication
is "one in respect of which ... no remedy can be had in a civil action, however hard it may
bear upon a person who claims to be injured thereby, and even though it may have been
made maliciously, and is false." 31 Malice is not a proper subject of inquiry when a state-
ment is absolutely privileged.31 With few exceptions not germane here, the application of
absolute privilege is limited to "pertinent "32 statements made in connection with legislative
and judicial proceedings and other acts of state.33
2. Qualified Privilege
"Conditional or qualified privilege is based on public policy. 34 The existence of a priv-
ilege does not change the actionable quality of the words published, but merely rebuts the
inference of malice that is imputed in the absence of privilege, and makes a showing of
falsity and actual malice essential to the right of recovery.35
A qualified or conditionally privileged communication is one made in good faith on any sub-
ject matter in which the person communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has
a right or duty, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty on a privileged
27.50 AM. Jun. 2D Libel and Slander § 193 (1970). See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
28. See Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959).
29. See 50 AM. JuR. 2D Libel and Slander § 3, nn.4 & 14 (1970).
30.50 Am. Juo. 2D Libel and Slander § 3 (1970). See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Adams, 196 Okla. 597, 168 P.2d 105
(1946) (court held that allegedly defamatory statements made in a State Industrial Commission proceeding which was authorized
by law were absolutely privileged and the issues of falsity and malice were irrelevant); Jones v. Trice, 210 Tenn. 535, 360 S.W.2d
48 (1962) (court held that libelous statements made by defendant in a case unrelated to the plaintiff were absolutely privileged and
could not be used as the basis for a libel action since the statements were made in the course ofjudicial proceedings and were
relevant and pertinent to the proceedings).
31.50 AM. Jun. 2o Libel and Slander § 199 (1970). See also Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y. 440, 121 N.E. 341 (1918)
(holding that malice destroys a qualified privilege but not an absolute privilege).
32. The pertinence required is not technical legal relevancy but rather a general frame of reference in relation to the subject
matter of the litigation. Ginsburg v. Black, 192 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934, rehg denied, 343
U.S. 958 (1952). In determining whether an alleged defamatory statement is pertinent, the question is whether the statement is
totally and indisputably unrelated to the subject of the action. Transport Resources v. Smith (In re Smith), 17 Bankr. 820, 821
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1982).
33. "Absolute privilege is confined within narrow limits, and the tendency and policy of the courts is not to extend such limits
unless the public policy upon which [the] privilege is based is found to exist in new situations." See 50 AM. JuR. 2D Libel and
Slander § 194 (1970) and cases cited therein.
34. See 50 AM. Jun. 2D Libel and Slander § 195 (1970) and cases cited therein.
35. See Flannery v. Allen, 47 Ill. App. 2d 308, 198 N.E.2d 563 (1964) (where defendant had written a letter to police com-
missioner containing allegedly defamatory statements regarding plaintiff policeman, court held that a qualified privilege presup-
poses an absence of malice); See generally 50 AM. Jun. 2D Libel and Slander § 195 n. 14 (1970).
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occasion and in a manner and under circumstances fairly warranted by the occasion and duty,
right, or interest.
36
Whether malice exists is a question of fact.37
3. The Judicial Proceedings Privilege as Absolute Privilege
The majority rule in the United States is that counsel, parties, and witnesses are abso-
lutely exempt38 from responsibility for libel or slander for words, otherwise defamatory,
published in the course of judicial proceedings 39 subject to the qualification that in order to
be privileged the statements must be pertinent or relevant to the case.4" The absolute privi-'
lege accorded to judicial proceedings is not restricted to trial. Rather, it extends to virtu-
ally any pertinent communication, including letters and out-of-court statements made
between parties with an interest in the subject matter of a pending judicial proceeding .41
C. Bankruptcy-Related Cases Discussing Assertion
of the Judicial Proceedings Privilege
1. New York Cases
The state of New York has a particularly well-developed body of case law respecting
assertion of the judicial proceedings privilege in bankruptcy matters.42 In Abrams v.
36.50 AM. JUR. 2DLibel and Slander§ 195 (1970). See Connor v. Timothy, 43 Ariz. 517, 33 P.2d 293 (1934) (statements by
school board member to other board members regarding a teacher's actions were held to be qualifiedly privileged); Putral v. Dor-
man, 76 Fla. 553, 80 So. 316 (1918) (quoting Abraham v. Baldwin, 52 Fla. 151,42 So. 591 (1906)) (in Putral, the court held
that merchants' association's practice of having attorney, who handled all collection matters for the association, inform other
members of debtors who fail to pay their accounts constituted a qualifiedly privileged communication); Judge v. Rockford Memo-
rial Hosp., 17 I11. App. 2d 365, 150 N.E.2d 202 (1958) (court held supervising nurse's letter to a nurses' professional registry
suggesting theft of drugs by plaintiff nurse to be qualifiedly privileged).
37. See generally Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572 (1946) (in suit brought by employee
against former employer for damages resulting from alleged slanderous statements, the court held that the jury was entitled to
consider all circumstances surrounding the alleged slanderous statements).
38. See Adams v. Alabama Lime & Stone Corp., 225 Ala. 174, 142 So. 424 (1932) (relevant and appropriate statements in
complaint held by court to be absolutely privileged communication); Massey v. Jones, 182 Va. 200, 28 S.E.2d 623 (1944) (rele-
vant statements made by a witness during the course of a trial held to be absolutely privileged communication); 50 AM. JUR. 2D
Libel and Slander § 231 n. 12 (1970). Cf Robertson v. Indus. Ins. Co., 75 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1954) (court held that statements in
letter sent to state insurance commissioner requesting hearing on the plaintiffs' insurance agent's actions were absolutely privi-
leged communication).
39. 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 232 (1970); Annotation, Libel and Slander: Application of Privilege Attending State-
ments Made in Course ofJudicial Proceedings to PretrialDeposition and Discovery Procedures, 23 A. L. R. 3d 1172 (1969). Gener-
ally, "[a] judicial proceeding. . . is one carried on in a court or tribunal ofjustice established or recognized by law wherein the
rights of parties which are recognized and protected by law are involved and may be determined." 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and
Slander § 232 (1970). Whether a proceeding is judicial within the rule of privilege is determined by state, not federal, law. See
Abrams v. Crompton-Richmond Co., 7 Misc. 2d 461, 164 N.Y.S.2d 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957), affd, 5 A.D.2d 811, 170
N.Y.S.2d 981 (N.Y. App. Div.) (holding that an arrangement proceeding in a bankruptcy action is a judicial proceeding under
New York law), appealdenied, 4 N.Y.2d 676, 173 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1958).
40. See generally 50 AM. JUR. 2oLibel and Slander§ 236 n. 19 (1970).
41. See Friedman v. Alexander, 79 A.D.2d 627, 433 N.Y.S.2d 627 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (out-of-court letters); Ganassi v.
Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C., 372 Pa. Super. 9,540 A.2d 272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (letters and affidavits sent to court); see gener-
ally 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander §§ 237, 238, 240, 241, 246, 247-49 (1970).
42. See, e.g., Weissman v. Hassett, 47 Bankr. 462 (S.D. N.Y. 1985). There the court noted that a bankruptcy trustee's report
on the results of his investigation into a fraud is privileged when distributed in accordance with a court order designating an appro-
priate method of distribution. Although Weissman concerned the actions of a bankruptcy trustee and not a creditor committee,
the case is important for its thorough discussion of the development in New York of thejudicial proceedings privilege in relation to
bankruptcy cases.
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Crompton-Richmond Co. ,43 the court found that alleged false and defamatory oral accusa-
tions made by creditors at a meeting called by the bankruptcy referee were absolutely priv-
ileged in that the bankruptcy case was, by nature, a judicial proceeding and the creditors'
statements had been made in connection with it. Similarly, in Schwartz v. Bartle," the
court extended the judicial proceedings privilege to letters mailed to others by members of
an informal committee of creditors. In extending the privilege, the court noted that the
existence of an informal creditor committee was clearly recognized under section 337(2)
of the Bankruptcy Act 45 and that such a committee "may exist or be organized prior or sub-
,,46sequent to the appointment of the official committee of creditors.
Later, in Zatzkin v. Cornell,4 7 the court held that remarks contained in a letter sent by a
creditor to the bankruptcy referee, to the trustee, and to the trustee's accountant, charging
that the president of the debtor diverted corporate assets and stole corporate opportunities
belonging to the corporation and requesting referral of the matter to federal authorities,
were, if libelous, absolutely privileged because made in connection with a bankruptcy
case, which is a judicial proceeding. 48 The court noted that the statements were "perti-
nent" to the bankruptcy case since they constituted an attempt by the creditor to encourage
a more diligent effort at marshalling the debtor's assets.49
Finally, in Friedman v. Alexander,"0 the court held that alleged defamatory letters sent by
the corporate debtor's president to members of various creditor committees appointed in
the case, outlining alleged improprieties on the part of another creditor of the debtor cor-
poration, were absolutely privileged. 5 The court reasoned that, since the letters were per-
tinent to the underlying bankruptcy case and directed solely to parties legitimately involved
in the bankruptcy case, the letters were absolutely privileged.
2
2. Other Jurisdictions
A number of courts in other jurisdictions have considered the judicial proceedings priv-
ilege in relation to bankruptcy cases. For example, in Ganassi v. Buchanan Ingersoll,
P C. , the court held that an alleged defamatory letter and affidavits submitted to a federal
district court by the debtor corporation's designated responsible officer, corporate coun-
sel, and outside counsel, in reply to the district court's request for input from those having
an interest in the corporate debtor's bankruptcy case, were issued in the "regular course" of
bankruptcy proceedings and thus were privileged communications, entitling their authors
43. 7 Misc. 2d 461, 164 N.Y.S.2d 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957), affd, 5 A.D.2d 811, 170 N.Y.S.2d 981 (N.Y. App. Div.),
appeal denied, 4 N.Y.2d 676, 173 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1958), discussed infra text accompanying notes 69-72.
44. 49 Misc. 2d 848, 268 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), discussed infra text accompanying notes 66-68.
45. 11 U.S.C. § 737(2) (1946).
46. Schwartz v. Bartle, 49 Misc. 2d at 850, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 718 (quoting 8 COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY 750 (14th ed. 1964)).
47.53 Misc. 2d 829, 279 N.Y.S.2d 934 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
48. Id. at 830, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
49. Id.
50. 79 A.D.2d 627, 433 N.Y.S.2d 627 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
51. Id. at 628, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
52. This suggests that statements made to those without any connection to the bankruptcy case will not be accorded an abso-
lute privilege. See Greening v. Klamen, 652 S.W.2d 730 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
53. 373 Pa. Super. 9,540 A.2d 272 (1988).
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to protection from claims of defamation, libel, and invasion of privacy.54  In In re Smith,
alleged defamatory statements contained in a non-dischargeability complaint were also
deemed to be absolutely privileged. 5
In an interesting twist on the concept of the judicial proceedings privilege, the court in
Kensington Development Corp. v. Israel56 held that the filing by an unsecured creditor com-
mittee of an allegedly frivolous notice of lis pendens was to be afforded only a qualified
privilege, even though filed in connection with an adversary complaint in a bankruptcy
case.5 7 The court noted that the adversary complaint had been dismissed twice, the sec-
ond time for lack ofjurisdiction.18 The court further noted that an action for slander of title
evolved in the common law to protect a property interest, whereas the tort of defamation
evolved to protect a person's reputation." The court also noted that Wisconsin's slander of
title statute would be effectively nullified if an absolute privilege were accorded the filing
of a notice of lis pendens .60 The court thus remanded the case to the lower court for deter-
mination of whether the filing of the lis pendens had been made with knowledge that its
contents or any part of the accompanying complaint were "false, sham or frivolous" within
the meaning of Wisconsin's slander of title statute .61
54. See also McLaughlin v. Copeland, 455 F. Supp. 749 (D. Del. 1978), affd, 595 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1979) (in which the
court held that a letter written by one attorney concerning a second attorney, and sent to a judge and other counsel in a bankruptcy
case in which all were involved, was absolutely privileged with respect to claims for defamation, interference with business rela-
tions, and civil conspiracy); Burton v. NCNB Nat'l Bank 85 N.C. App. 702,355 S.E.2d 800 (1987) (recognizing the general rule
that out-of-court statements, including letters between parties to a judicial proceeding or their attorneys, which are pertinent to
the proceeding, are absolutely privileged and thus not actionable on the ground of defamation); Lee v. Nash, 65 Or. App. 538,
540, 671 P.2d 703, 705 (1983) (holding that "a]n attorney is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning an-
other in communications during the course of and as a part ofajudicial proceeding, including a bankruptcy proceeding." (motion
filed in bankruptcy court erroneously naming plaintiff as a co-petitioner under Chapter 13 wage-earner plan)).
55. 17 Bankr. 820 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982). Note that Smith involved a counterclaim by the debtor in response to a dischar-
geabiity complaint filed against the debtor. Such a counterclaim is a "core proceeding" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(2)(c)
(1988), and the bankruptcy court thus had jurisdiction to consider the matter. Note also that, pursuant to It U.S.C. § 107(b)
(1988), and Bankruptcy Rule 9018, the court may, on motion or on its own initiative, protect a "person" (see I I U.S.C. §
101(35) (1988)) with respect to "scandalous or defamatory material" contained in a paper filed in a bankruptcy case. Though the
"absolute privilege" cases discussed in this section may provide argument to the contrary, such "protection" might possibly include
an injunctive order, issued pursuant to II U.S.C. § 105 (1988). An order issued pursuant to II U.S.C. § 105 could be accompa-
nied by an appropriate sanction (including, among other things, attorney fees and expenses) imposed pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule
9011, which states, in part:
The signature of an attorney or a party [on every petition, pleading, motion and other paper served or filed in a case
under the Code] constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the document; that to the best of the attorney's
or party's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause delay, or to increase the cost of litigation.
II U.S.C. app. § 9011 (1988). An appropriate sanction might also include imposition on an attorney, personally, of any excess
costs, expenses, and attorney fees occasioned by the attorney's (or his or her client's) "unreasonable and vexatious" conduct. See
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988).
56. 142 Wis. 2d 894, 419 N.W.2d 241 (1988).
57. Id. at 903, 419 N.W.2d at 244.
58. Id. at 899, 419 N.W.2d at 242.
59. Id. at 900-01,419 N.W.2d at 243.
60. id. at 903,419 N.W.2d at 244.
61. Id. at 904, 419 N.W.2d at 245.
1989]
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3. Conclusion
The foregoing cases suggest that the absolute judicial proceedings privilege as applied to
bankruptcy proceedings is alive and well. 62 As discussed in the following, additional bases
for establishing a privilege in favor of a committee can be found in the Code itself.
IV. STATUTORY DEFENSES TO CLAIMS AGAINST COMMITTEES
A. Bankruptcy Act of 1898
1. Introduction
Section 21 (i) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, II U.S.C. § 44(i) (1946), conferred a
qualified privilege upon certain persons to make statements in connection with bankruptcy
cases. It states:
A communication by a creditor, by the receiver or the trustee of a bankrupt, by the attorney
for any of them, or by the referee to a creditor, to the receiver or trustee of the bankrupt, to the
attorney for any of them, to the referee or to the bankrupt or his attorney, uttered in good faith
and with reasonable grounds for belief in its truth, concerning the conduct, acts, or property
of the bankrupt, shall be privileged and the creditor, receiver, trustee, attorney, or referee so
uttering the same shall not be held liable therefor.
6 3
Section 2 1 (i) of the Act thus purported to provide a special class of privileged communica-
tions which would be controlling in all proceedings, whether federal or state.64
At the time section 2 1 (i) was enacted, "a question was raised as to whether or not Con-
gress could thus alter state law as to privileged communications."65 Perhaps in recognition
of a potential constitutional issue, there appear to be no reported cases finding a qualified
privilege in favor of a person solely on the basis of section 2 1 (i) of the Act. In fact, the
reported cases arising under the Act discussed both the qualified privilege under section
2 1 (i) of the Act and the absolute judicial proceedings privilege but then decided the case
exclusively by application of the absolute judicial proceedings privilege.
62. Courts considering creditor committee liability issues have given fairly narrow application to the attorney-client privilege,
however. See In re Christian Life Center, First Assembly of God, 16 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1981), in which the court held
that, since a creditor committee "does not have the power to act or the title of a trustee it wouldn't need or deserve the attorney-
client privilege since they should make their activities known to the creditors and to the Court." Id. at 37. Cf In re Baldwin-
United Corp., 38 Bankr. 802 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984), in which the court, declining to follow In re Christian Life Center, held
that a creditor committee may assert the attorney-client privilege "when disclosure of privileged communications is sought by
those who are not represented by the committee, or who stand in an adversarial relationship with it." Id. at 804-05. The court also
noted that in asserting the privilege against members of its own constituency, "the committee should bear the burden of establish-
ing good cause for not disclosing privileged information to its constituent creditors." Id. at 805. Baldwin, it is submitted, repre-
sents the sounder view, since a committee is statutorily authorized, with court approval, to retain counsel (I I U.S.C. § 1103(a)
(1988)), and its rationale is, moreover, consistent with the general rule that, where several parties employ the same attorney to act
for them, their confidential communications to the attorney are entitled to privilege from disclosure as against third parties. See
Annotation, Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Communications in the Presence of Two or More Persons Interested in the Sub-
ject Matter to Which the Communications Relate, 141 A.L.R. 553 (1942); 81 As. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 189 (1976). Finally, it
must be noted that at least one older court decision has held that where only some of the represented parties attended the confer-
ence at which the privileged communication was made, the privilege did not extend to the other parties who were not present.
Harris v. Daugherty, 74 Tex. 1, 11 S.W. 921 (1889).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 44(i) (1946).
64. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 21.32 (14th ed. 1976) [hereinafter 2 COLLIER].




In Schwartz v. Bartle, the Supreme Court of New York held that alleged defamatory
letters describing the plaintiffs dealings with several bankrupt corporations, drafted and
mailed by members of an informal committee of creditors of the corporations and their
agent, were absolutely privileged within the meaning of the judicial proceedings privi-
lege.6 7 The court stated:
The proceedings before the Federal Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York
involving the two bankrupt corporations werejudicial proceedings as defined in the law of this
State. . .. The privilege extends to letters between the parties or the attorneys or addressed to
the court in connection with the proceedings, providing, again, that they are pertinent thereto
.... The defendants are interested parties as they were creditors of the debtor corporations
whose estates were being administered in the bankruptcy proceedings . . . . Further, the
Bankruptcy Act, Section 21, Subdivision (i), (U.S. Code, tit. 11, § 44, subd. [i]) provides
that "A communication by a creditor *** [or] by the attorney for any of them *** uttered in
good faith and with reasonable grounds for belief in its truth, concerning the conduct, acts or
property of the bankrupt, shall be privileged and the creditor *** [or] attorney *** so uttering
the same shall not be held liable therefor." It is thus explicitly provided in the Act that a privi-
lege exists in favor of the defendants in this matter . . . . Therefore the defense of privilege
interposed is absolute and operates as a complete bar to the plaintiffs cause of action as against
each of the respective defendants in the action. 
68
InAbrams v. Crompton-Richmond Co. ,69 during a meeting of "interested parties" called
by the referee in bankruptcy, creditors of a debtor corporation made allegedly defamatory
statements regarding others with whom the debtor had business dealings. Plaintiffs filed
suit in New York, alleging that they had been slandered.7" The defendants asserted the ju-
dicial proceedings privilege as an absolute defense.7" In granting the defendants' motion to
dismiss the complaint and for summary judgment, the court stated:
Inasmuch as the arrangement proceeding itself was by nature ajudicial proceeding, many por-
tions of which may involve all the forms of a trial, proceedings in the bankruptcy court are
judicial proceedings. The hearing was, as a portion of arrangement proceedings in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, entitled to the cloak of privilege.
The plaintiffs' brief points out that a bankruptcy referee is not a judicial officer. We do not
pass upon this question, as the only requirement is that the proceedings be judicial. It should
further be noted that the characterization of the proceedings as judicial is determined by the
law of New York and that, while the Federal statutes provide a lesser privilege under 11
66.49 Misc. 2d 848, 268 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
67. Id. at 849-50, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
68. Id. at 849-5I, 268 N.Y. S.2d at 717-19 (citations omitted). Although the court in Schwartz purported to rely, in part, on §
21(i) of the Act, which conferred a qualified privilege on parties to a bankruptcy case, it in fact relied on thejudicial proceedings
privilege, since it held that there was an absolute privilege existing in favor of the defendants in the case and § 21 (i) of the Act
afforded only a qualified privilege.
69.7 Misc. 2d 461, 164 N.Y.S.2d 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957), affd, 5 A.D.2d 811, 170 N.Y.S.2d 981 (N.Y. App. Div.),
appeal denied, 4 N.Y.2d 676, 173 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1958).
70. Id. at 461, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 125.
71. Id. at 462, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 125.
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U.S.C. § 44, sub. i than the law of New York, it would not destroy the greater protection
afforded by New York law.
72
3. Repeal of Section 21 (i) of the Act
Section 2 1(i) of the Act was repealed when the Code was enacted in 1979. 73 Moreover,
no equivalent of section 21(i) was included in the Code. The House and Senate Reports
concerning enactment of the Code are silent as to the reasons for omission of a "substitute"
section 21 (i).7 4 Thus, section 21 (i) may no longer be a source of qualified privilege in
bankruptcy matters.
B. The Bankruptcy Code
1. Code Section 1125(e)
a. Under Prior Law
The only explicit grant of immunity in the Code is found in 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e)
(1988). The original version of section 1125(e), 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e) (Supp. IV 1976),
stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
A person that solicits, in good faith and in compliance with the applicable provisions of this
title, or that participates, in good faith and in compliance with the applicable provisions of this
title, in the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase of a security, offered or sold under the plan, ...
is not liable, on account of such solicitation or participation, for violation of any applicable
law, rule, or regulation governing the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase of securities.
75
The original version thus provided a "safe harbor" for "persons" 76 whose good faith state-
72. Id. at 462, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 125-26. See also Greening v. Klamen, 652 S.W.2d 730 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). This case
involved an allegedly defamatory letter sent by an attorney to other attorneys, a bankruptcy judge, a trustee, and two potential
reorganization investors respecting the dealings of shareholders of a bankrupt corporation. Id. at 732. Recognizing that plead-
ings and other papers filed in a case before a court having jurisdiction are generally absolutely privileged, the court held that "II
U.S.C. § 44(i) (1976) of the bankruptcy act, does not extend this absolute privilege or any limited privileges to communications
made to a non-party in a bankruptcy proceeding." Id. at 734 (citations omitted). The court sustained the defendants' motion to
dismiss on other grounds.
73. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2682 (1978).
74. "Cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act are persuasive authority under the Bankruptcy Code where the language in the
corresponding sections of the Act and the Code remain virtually unchanged." Northwest Beverage, Inc. v. Johnson (In re North-
west Beverage, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 631, 634 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985). However, "where a statute with respect to one subject
contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute is significant to show a different intention ex-
isted." Palestino v. Palestino (In re Palestino), 4 Bankr. 721, 722 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980) (quoting General Elec. Co. v. South-
ern Constr. Co., 383 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968)). See also 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CoNsTRUcrTioN § 51.04 (N. Singer 4th ed. 1984) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND], which states that "[pirovisions in an obsolete and
inoperative act which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter cannot be applied in a proceeding under the
other act because to do so would give effect to the inoperative act." Id. Thus, it could be argued that Congress' express repeal of
the Act and its failure to enact an equivalent to § 21(i) in the Code evidences its express intent that statements made in connection
with cases under the Code not be afforded even a qualified privilege. However, as Sutherland and other authorities also point out,
the express repeal of a statute and enactment of a similar statute does not necessarily abrogate the comnon law relating to the
subject matter of the former statute. See SUTHERLAND, supra, § 45.12; Atkins v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 186, 556 F.2d 1028
(Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1983), appeal after rentand, 711
F2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1983). It thus appears to be the sounder view that the common lawjudicial proceedings privilege relative to
bankruptcy cases still exists and was unaffected by the repeal of § 21 (i) of the Act. See also In re Smith, 17 Bankr. 820 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1982) and Ganassi v. Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C., 372 Pa. Super 9, 540 A.2d 272 (Pa. Super Ct. 1988), both of which were
"judicial proceedings privilege" cases involving bankruptcy cases commenced under the Code.
75. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e) (Supp. IV 1976).
76. See II U.S.C. § 101(35) (1988).
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ments, made in connection with the solicitation of acceptances or rejections of a proposed
reorganization plan, might otherwise constitute actionable misstatements within the
meaning of the federal securities laws.77
b. Under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 198478 made several
amendments to section 1125 of the Code. Subsection (e) was amended to include "the ac-
ceptance or rejection of a plan" and the "solicitation of acceptance or rejection of a plan"
within the safe harbor rules of that subsection. It now reads, in pertinent part:
A person that solicits acceptance or rejection of a plan, in good faith and in compliance with
the applicable provisions of this title, or that participates, in good faith and in compliance with
the applicable provisions of this title, in the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase of a security,
offered or sold under the plan, . . . is not liable, on account of such solicitation or participa-
tion, for violation of any applicable law, rule, or regulation governing solicitation of accept-
ance or rejection of a plan or the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase of securities.
79
It would thus appear that Congress, in amending section 1125(e), intended to extend the
section's protections to persons who make "good faith" statements in connection with the
solicitation of the acceptance or rejection of a reorganization plan, irrespective of whether
such statements might be actionable under the federal securities laws. However, there is no
illuminating legislative history which accompanies this particular amendment. Moreover,
the only reported decision discussing amended section 1125(e) in the context of a commit-
tee's alleged defamatory statements does not focus on the amendment.8 ° Hence, it will be
for other courts to determine whether amended section 1125(e) confers a broader qualified
privilege on creditor committees and others who make statements in connection with plan
solicitation.
77. See 5 COLLIER, supra note 15, 1125.03(7). The House Report accompanying the original version of section 1125(e)
stated, in part:
The purpose of the provision is to protect creditors, creditors' committees, counsel fbr committees, and others involved
in the case from potential liability under the securities laws for soliciting acceptances of a plan by use of an approved
disclosure statement. The securities laws generally provide for absolute liability of a person that offers or sells securities
if there was the failure to state a material fact in connection with the offer or sale.
H.R. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 229 (1977).
78. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e) (1988).
80. See Central Transp., Inc. v. Roberto (In re Tucker Freight Lines, Inc.), 62 Bankr. 213 (W.D. Mich. 1986). There, the
debtor's sole shareholder filed suit against members of the official unsecured creditor committee, alleging that their discourage-
ment of the unsecured creditors from voting for a proposed reorganization plan, by mailing a letter which included information
the members knew or should have known was false, was a tortious act. Id. at 215. The defendants moved for summary judg-
ment, claiming that as members of the committee, they had absolute immunity from such suits. Pointing out that [then amended]
section 1125(e) is the only explicit grant of immunity found in the Code, but not discussing the amendment in relation to the facts
of the case, the court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id. at 216, 218. The court then opined that section
1103(c) of the Code might constitute an implicit grant of limited immunity to parties such as the defendants. id. at 216. However,
the court stated that, if the allegations of the plaintiffs complaint were true, the committee had violated its fiduciary responsibili-
ties by their reckless actions, which demonstrated a lack of good faith, and were therefore deprived of any limited immunity they
might otherwise hold. Id. The case report does not indicate that either the parties or the court considered the common law judi-
cial proceedings privilege.
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2. Code Section 1109(b)
Pursuant to section 1109(b) of the Code,"' a party in interest, including a creditor com-
mittee, an equity security holder committee, and a creditor, may raise and may appear and
be heard on any issue in a Chapter 11 case. Thus, for example, it has been held that a
creditor committee has standing to seek injunctive relief without first seeking action from
the debtor itself or prior permission of the bankruptcy court.82 Therefore, at least in the
context of a lawsuit in which a creditor committee becomes involved, it can be argued that
thejudicial proceedings privilege attaches by virtue of section 1109(b) to creditor commit-
tee statements made in connection with the lawsuit.
3. Code Section 1103(c)
As noted above,83 the court in In re Tucker Freight Lines opined that section 1103(c) of
the Code might be an implicit grant of limited immunity to creditor committees.84 Indeed,
the mandatory nature of the committee's responsibilities under section 1103(c) of the
Code supports this position. For example, section 1103(c) states that a committee "may"
exercise certain functions; however, the exercise of such duties is not necessarily permis-
sive." In fact, after the committee is appointed pursuant to section 1102, the committee
and the trustee must meet to transact such business as may be necessary and proper.
86
When this responsibility is considered in conjunction with the committee's fiduciary duty
to serve the best interests of its constituency, it becomes apparent that a committee should,
minimally, enjoy a qualified privilege to perform its statutory functions.87
4. Code Section 105
Section 105(a) of the Code states:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry
out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by
a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action
or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or
rules, or to prevent an abuse of process. 8
Section 105(a) has not been construed to create any specific privilege in favor of creditor
81. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1988).
82. Louisiana World Exposition, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co. (In re Louisiana World Exposition, Inc.), 832 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir.
1987). But cf Rollert Co. v. Charter Crude Oil Co. (In re Charter Co.), 50 Bankr. 57 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985) (the court held
that section 1109(b) applies only to bankruptcy cases and does not create an unconditional right of a creditor committee to inter-
vene in an adversary proceeding).
83. See supra note 80.
84. A creditor committee might also have qualified immunity in connection with a request for the appointment of a Chapter
11 trustee pursuant to I I U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
85. See generally 5 COLLIER, supra note 15, 1103.07.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(d) (1988). Further, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTrs § 592A (1976) states: "One who is required
by law to publish defamatory matter is absolutely privileged to publish it." Thus, to the extent that the committee's duties to advise
its constituency regarding the debtor's affairs can be considered mandatory under the law, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrS §
592A gives support to the protection of such activities.
87. A considerable number of state courts have held that a qualified privilege attaches to communications made to persons
standing in a confidential or fiduciary relation to each other. See generally 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 212 (1970) and
infra Section V.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
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committees or others. However, it was recently applied by the bankruptcy court in Poly-
gram Distribution, Inc. v. B-A Systems, Inc. 89 to permanently enjoin a state court civil
action alleging defamation and tortious interference with contractual relations on the part
of members of a creditor committee.90
The court construed the bankruptcy jurisdictional statute 91 to confer on itself "core"ju-
risdiction to permanently enjoin the state court lawsuit. 92 The court then stated:
If the members of the creditors' committee must face the resumption of the state court actions
after the cessation of estate administration, the evidence which has been somewhat completely
adduced shows that they will not continue to disclose facts to the trustee and his attorney which
are necessary to be disclosed if the trustee's suit for recovery of the assets of the estate is to
have any chance of being successful ....
In respect of the rights sought to be enforced by the trustee in the state court action, more-
over, it can only be said that they are of paramount importance in the context of the purposes of
the bankruptcy laws themselves. If the officers of an estate can collect the assets of that estate
only at the cost of personally defending actions which threaten their personal assets brought by
those who would forestall collection through the stratagem of filing such suits, then it seems
that any significant and effective collection of bankruptcy estates must come to an end. And it
is through the process of asset collection that, in the final analysis, the bankruptcy courts are
able to assure the honesty of debtors.
9 3
The court in Polygram thus went to lengths to assert its section 105 power, effectively
affording members of the creditor committee a privilege for their statements.94 The court's
statement that the collection of assets is the only sure way "to assure the honesty of
debtors"9 5 is further evidence that the efforts of a creditor committee to achieve this end
should, at least in limited instances, be protected.
V. OTHER SOURCES OF DEFENSES
A. Introduction
The foregoing sections of this article have focused on specific privileges which arise in
the course of a judicial proceeding or in construing the bankruptcy laws. Additionally,
there exist qualified privileges and defenses in other areas of the law, which might be as-
serted by a committee. These are discussed briefly in the following sections.
89.63 Bankr. 1011 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
90. Id. at 1012.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
92. Interestingly, the court found that the federal district court for the judicial district could not have enjoined the lawsuit
because of the provisions of the Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988), and because of the "mandatory absten-
tion" provisions of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, found at 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (1988). 63
Bankr. at 1016-18.
93. Id. at 1018-19 (citations omitted).
94. Note, however, that the Polygram court found that the creditor committee's alleged transgressions took place during the
pendency of the underlying Chapter It case and were accomplished in the course of the "good faith carrying out of the duties of
the officers of the estate . I... d. at 1019 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the court found that the creditor committee was
engaging in the collection of assets of the estate when it committed the alleged transgressions. Id. Accordingly, although not
purporting to afford a specific privilege to the members of the creditor committee, Polygram, in reality, is a recognition of only a
qualified privilege in their favor. Had the court found that the creditor committee members were not in good faith carrying out
their statutory responsibilities, the court might well have refused to issue the permanent injunction.
95.63 Bankr. at 1019.
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B. Communications By or Between Creditors
The common law affords to creditors of the same debtor a qualified privilege to make
statements concerning the debtor, if such statements relate to the creditor's business, and if
they are not made maliciously.9 6 A committee may therefore consider utilizing this de-
fense.
C. Fiduciary Communications
According to a number of cases, a qualified privilege attaches to communications pass-
ing between persons standing in a confidential relationship to each other, insofar as such
statements are made in good faith and in furtherance of a mutual interest.97 Since members
of creditor committees have been held to owe a fiduciary duty to their constituents, 98 com-
mittees may have available to them this qualified privilege.
D. Interference with Business Relations
As noted above, claims against committees for defamation are sometimes accompanied
by related claims arising out of the same conduct, such as tortious interference with busi-
ness relations. 99 If the committee is successful in asserting the defense of absolute privi-
lege, then such other claims would not ordinarily be considered.1 00
Moreover, in some jurisdictions, justification for interfering with the business relations
of another exists where the actor's sole motive is to benefit himself and not to cause harm to
the other.'0 1 Courts in several cases held that the existence of a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the interferor and a third party constitutes sufficient justification for inducing the
96. See, e.g., Crawford v. General Contract Corp., 174 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Ark. 1959) (information exchanged by mutual
creditors of plaintiff having a mutual interest in the subject matter held to be qualifiedly privileged); Simons v. Petersberger, 181
Iowa 770, 165 N.W 91 (1917) (attorney's good faith in corresponding on behalf of a creditor with credit company precluded
finding of malice in libel action); 50 AM. JUR. 2DLibel and Slander § 267 (1970); Annotation, Libel: Imputing Credit Unworthi-
ness to Nontrader, 99 A.L.R.2d 700 (1965).
97. See, e.g., Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477,140 S.W. 257 (1911); 50 AM. JUR. 2o Libel and Slander §
212 n. 15 (1970). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTrs § 596 (1976), which states: "An occasion makes a publication conditionally
privileged if the circumstances lead any one of several persons having a common interest in a particular subject matter correctly
or reasonably to believe that there is information that another sharing the common interest is entitled to know." Id.
98. See Central Transp., Inc. v. Roberto (In re Tucker Freight Lines, Inc.), 62 Bankr. 213 (W. D. Mich. 1986); and 5 COLLIER,
supra note 15, at 1103.07.
99. See supr note 54; McLaughlin v. Copeland, 455 F. Supp. 749 (D. Del. 1978), affd, 595 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1979) (defa-
mation, malicious interference with business relations and civil conspiracy). See supra note 42; and Weissman v. Hassett, 47
Bankr. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (libel, intentional interference with business relations, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress).
100. For example, the court in Weissman, 47 Bankr. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) refused to consider the plaintiffs' additional claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and intentional interference with a business relationship once it found that the de-
fendant trustee's investigation report was absolutely privileged in relation to the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 468. The court
stated:
[T]he plaintiffs attempt to skirt the Trustee's immunity defense to the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress
and tortious interference with business relations. . . . The plaintiffs cannot avoid the rule of absolute immunity in this
manner. To distinguish the improperly conducted investigation from the otherwise proper exercise of quasi-judicial au-
thority would "emasculate the immunity defense by applying it only to conduct for which it is not needed." All three
claims arise out of the investigation and Report. Absolute immunity for that conduct attaches to each claim.
Id. at 468 n.5 (citations omitted).
101. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 30 (1969). See Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 134 N.W.2d 892
(1965); Williams v. Ashcraft, 72 N.M. 120, 381 P.2d 55 (1963). However, there is a split of authority on this question. See
American Surety Co. v. Schottenbauer, 257 F.2d 6, 11 (8th Cir. 1958) (discussion of differing views where acts are undertaken
solely to further financial or economic interests); Annotation, Liability for Procuring Breach of Contract, 84 A.L.R. 43 (1933).
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third party to breach his contract with the plaintiff. 102 The law of the particular jurisdiction
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VI. CONCLUSION
Thejudicial proceedings privilege can be asserted against most claims for liability aris-
ing.out of alleged defamatory or injurious statements made by members of committees.
Additionally, sections 105, 1103, 1109, and 1125 of the Code can be construed to create
qualified privileges in favor of committees. When added to the substantial number of qual-
ified privileges which exist at common law in various states, creditor committees should be
protected from most, but perhaps not all, potential liabilities for statements made during
the course of performing their statutory duties.
102. See Hopper v. Lennen & Mitchell, 52 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. Cal. 1943), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 146
F2d 364 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding that principal is privileged to induce agent to breach contract with a third party in view of confi-
dential relationship between the two); Lawless v. Brotherhood of Painters, 143 Cal. App. 2d 474, 478; 300 P.2d 159, 162 (1956)
("One who is in a confidential relationship with a party to a contract is privileged to induce the breach of that contract."). Thus,
again, since members of committees are considered to be fiduciaries of their constituents, committee members may attempt to
rely upon this particular line of authority in defending against claims for interference.
103. For other general discussions and specific cases regarding the tort of interference and justification therefor, see 45 AM.
JUR. 2D Interference §§ 27-37 (1969); Annotation, Liability of Third Party for Interference with Prospective Contractual Relation-
ship Between Two Other Parties, 6 A. L. R.4th 195 (1981); Annotation, Liability of One Who Induces or Causes a Third Person Not
to Enter Into or Continue a Business Relation With Another, 9 A.L.R.2d 228 (1950); Annotation, Liability for Preventing One
From Making Specific Contract, 99 A.L.R. 12 (1935).

